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Abstract
Background: There is growing interest on the impact of performance-based financing (PBF) on health workers’
motivation and performance. However, the literature so far tends to look at PBF payments in isolation, without
reference to the overall remuneration of health workers. Taking the case of Sierra Leone, where PBF was introduced
in 2011, this study investigates the absolute and relative contribution of PBF to health workers’ income and explores
their views on PBF bonuses, in comparison to and interaction with other incomes.
Methods: The study is based on a mixed-methods research consisting in a survey and an 8-week longitudinal logbook
collecting data on the incomes of primary health workers (n = 266) and 39 in-depth interviews with a subsample of the
same workers, carried out in three districts of Sierra Leone (Bo, Kenema and Moyamba).
Results: Our results show that in this setting PBF contributes about 10 % of the total income of health workers.
Despite this relatively low contribution, their views on the bonuses are positive, especially compared to the negative
views on salary. We find that this is because PBF is seen as a complement, with less sense of entitlement compared to
the official salary. Moreover, PBF has a specific role within the income utilization strategies enacted by health workers,
as it provides extra money which can be used for emergencies or reinvested in income generating activities. However,
implementation issues with the PBF scheme, such as delays in payment and difficulties in access, cause a
series of problems that limit the motivational effects of the incentives. Overall, staff still favor salary increases
over increases in PBF.
Conclusions: The study confirms that the remuneration of health workers is complex and interrelated so that
the different financial incentives cannot be examined independently from one. It also shows that the implementation
of PBF schemes has an impact on the way it does or does not motivate health workers, and must be thoroughly
researched in order to assess the impact of PBF.
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Background
Performance-based financing (PBF) schemes are imple-
mented in a growing number of low and middle-income
countries and in particular in sub-Saharan Africa. At the
moment, there are about 34 countries in Africa where at
least one pilot or regional scheme is in place [1]. In a
few countries, notably Burundi, Rwanda and Sierra
Leone, the setting of this research, PBF has been intro-
duced at national level. In a nutshell, PBF schemes entail
the payment of a financial bonus to healthcare providers
based on their performance, measured by the quantity of
services provided (or the achievement of a coverage
target), out of a list of pre-identified indicators, usually
adjusted by a measure of structural quality. The per-
formance bonus is normally used to cover facility
running costs and individual staff incentives. PBF is en-
visaged to improve the quantity and quality of services
provided by increasing the motivation of health workers
and their responsiveness to patients’ needs. It is also ex-
pected to have positive systemic effects through the
reorganization and clarification of roles and responsibil-
ities between actors and increased autonomy of pro-
viders, transparency and accountability [2, 3].
Research on the impact of PBF schemes has substan-
tially expanded in the last years, and studies have fo-
cused on health outcomes and outputs [4–8], and some
process indicators of quality of care [9] and motivation
of health workers. This last aspect is the focus of this
paper. Limited but growing evidence exists on the rela-
tion between financial incentives and health workers’
motivation and performance, with a focus on whether
PBF affects intrinsic motivation [8, 10–14]. The evidence
so far tends to look at PBF payments in isolation, with-
out reference to the broader context of the overall remu-
neration and the other earning opportunities of health
workers. However, we know that health workers, and in
particular those in low and middle income settings, earn
their revenues from a variety of official and unofficial
sources, both related to their activities in the health
sector as well as those outside [15–17].
In this paper, we aim to fill this gap in the literature by
exploring the role of performance-based payments in
the context of the entire complex remuneration of
health workers, and in relation to the other revenues
that they receive [17]. Taking the case of Sierra Leone,
where a PBF scheme was introduced for primary
healthcare facilities in 2011, this study investigates the
absolute and relative contribution of PBF to the over-
all income of health workers, explores the views of
health workers on performance payments, and ana-
lyzes their perceptions of revenues and livelihoods
with regards to PBF but also in interaction with other
incomes. The analysis is based on a mixed-methods
research, including a cross-sectional and longitudinal
survey and in-depth interviews with public primary health
workers, conducted in three districts in Sierra Leone.
Study setting
In Sierra Leone, following the launch of the Free Health
Care Initiative (FHCI) in 2010 which introduced fee ex-
emptions for pregnant women and children under five, a
series of complementary reforms has been introduced,
many of which addressed issues related to the payment
and motivation of health workers [18]. First, in 2010, the
public payroll was cleaned to eliminate ‘ghost’ workers
and add ‘volunteers’. At the same time, the salary was
substantially increased for all technical health workers
employed by the Ministry of Health and Sanitation
(MoHS). In 2011, a PBF scheme was introduced in pri-
mary healthcare facilities nationwide. This scheme was
meant to complement the salary increase for staff and
substitute the ‘cash to facility’ program in place before
[18], and therefore includes a bonus to be shared be-
tween facility and staff. Finally, in 2012, a remote allow-
ance for health workers employed in rural regions was
also introduced, although it was discontinued towards
the end of the same year, because of cash-flow issues.
These reforms profoundly reshaped the remuneration of
health workers, into a rational and coherent (at least in
the design) package [19]. To align to the governmental
policies on incentives, donors and many NGOs also
gradually eliminated most of the top-ups payed to health
workers, and often to those in charge of disease-specific
services (e.g., TB and HIV/AIDS).
The PBF design was purposefully simple and the
scheme was introduced nationally without piloting, but
limited to primary healthcare facilities and not including
hospitals (later, a pilot scheme was also created for two
hospitals in Freetown). Primary facilities include three
types of health centers: Community Health Centers,
Community Health Posts and Maternal and Child
Health Posts1. The performance bonus is calculated
quarterly as a fee-for-service payment based on the
number of services produced for six indicators (Table 1)
[20]. The bonus accrued from the quantity of services
provided is then multiplied by a quality score, calculated
based on a pre-defined checklist. The checklist includes
items concerning the proper completion of the relevant
registries for family planning, antenatal and postnatal
visits, immunization, under-five consultations, the cor-
rect use of partograph for each delivery, the existence of
a suitable environment for delivery (cleanliness and
availability of equipment) and of a cold chain for
immunization. The verification of quantity (by cross-
checking the facility registry and declaration) and quality
(by compiling the checklist) is performed by the District
Health Management Team (DHMTs) in collaboration
with the Local Council, the administrative body at
Bertone et al. BMC Health Services Research  (2016) 16:286 Page 2 of 10
district level. The performance bonus is paid into the
facility’s bank account every quarter, and can be used for
two purposes: a minimum of 40 % of the bonus has to
be used to cover the facility’s running costs and small in-
vestments (e.g., sanitation and hygiene materials, furni-
ture and small equipment, transport and communication
means, stationery, repairs, etc.) and for the payment of
casual staff, such as traditional birth assistants (TBAs)
and community health workers (CHWs). A maximum of
60 % of the bonus can be used to pay performance
bonuses to staff. The bonus for each health worker is de-
termined according to a ‘points’ system based on the
cadre of the health worker. For example, Community
Health Officers (CHOs) and midwives receive 10 points,
Community Health Assistants (CHAs) and nurses 9
points and Maternal and Child Health (MCH) Aides 8
points. Nurses in-charge of the facility, whatever their
cadre, receive 2 extra points [20].
Despite its simple design, the implementation of the
PBF scheme faced numerous challenges. An external
evaluation by an international NGO was performed in
April 2014 looking over the 2 years of scheme imple-
mentation. It revealed the weakness of the verification
process and found large discrepancies between the indi-
cators verified internally by DHMTs and Local Councils
and used to calculate the performance bonuses. More-
over, practical and logistic challenges in the verification
procedures resulted in delays of about 1 year in the pay-
ment of the performance bonus [21]. At district level,
there is evidence [22] that the implementation of the
PBF scheme depended on the presence of NGOs operat-
ing there. In particular, in Kenema, an NGO was sup-
porting the PBF scheme, by contributing the logistic and
financial means that the DHMT needed to carry out
verification and supervisions, as well as by providing
facilities with training, equipment and drugs focused
specifically on the services included in the PBF scheme.
In the districts of Bo and Moyamba, NGO support to fa-
cilities was more fragmented and not focused on PBF
and PBF indicators.
Methods
This study is based on a mixed-methods research carried
out in the districts of Bo, Kenema and Moyamba, be-
tween September 2013 and April 2014. Quantitative data
were collected from about 200 primary healthcare facil-
ities, where 266 health workers were interviewed. The
sample includes the cadres of trained nurses working in
health centers, i.e. CHOs (n = 30); CHAs, nurses and
midwives (grouped together in the analysis) (n = 76); and
MCH Aides (n = 160).
Quantitative data collection consisted in a cross-
sectional survey and an 8-week longitudinal logbook
collecting data on HWs incomes. Specifically, the
survey focused on demographic information as well
as on earnings from salary, remote allowance, PBF
bonus, share of user fees, top-ups/salary supplemen-
tations, per diems, and income-generating activities
from outside of the health sector. The longitudinal
logbook was left with the health workers to be filled
in daily with the activities carried out and all the
revenues earned each day. After a preliminary ana-
lysis, it was decided to estimate the total monthly in-
come of health workers by using data from the
survey where available (i.e. for data on salary, remote
allowance, PBF bonus, user fees, salary supplementa-
tions, per diems, and non-health incomes), and from
the logbooks for earnings from sale of drugs, gifts
and payments from patients, and private practice
[23]. Based on these data, we calculated the average
monthly amount for each income for each individual
health worker, including for PBF bonuses. We then
computed their importance relative to total income,
and estimated two series of regressions, using both
standard models and multi-level ones to account for
regional differences. We applied a logistic model to
explore the determinants of the likelihood of receiv-
ing a PBF bonus, and we ran a linear regression of
the amount of PBF bonus received to explore the
relative importance of individual and facility-level
factors. In the case of the linear regression, the
multi-level model with fixed effects at district level
proved superior to the traditional regression (p <
0.0001), and we report results from that model. At
individual level explanatory variables include gender,
age, cadre, and role within facility, while at facility
level they include type and size of facility, urban/
rural, and district. Data on other factors which could
influence the amount of PBF bonus via the quality
component, such as correctly filled-in registries and
Table 1 Indicators included in the PBF scheme
Indicator Payment per service
provided
Leones USD
New and current users of family planning 1,000 0.25
Pregnant women completing four antenatal
consultations
6,000 1.40
Women in labor assisted by skilled personnel
at facility
10,000 2.30
Women completing three postnatal
consultations
6,000 1.40
Children under 12 months completing
their immunization course
6,000 1.40
Outpatient visits of children under 5 years 300 0.07
Note: Exchange rate at the time of data collection (October 2013): 1
USD = 4,270 Leones
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availability of essential drugs, equipment and infra-
structure were not collected.
Qualitative data were collected based on two rounds of
semi-structured in-depth interviews with health workers.
In total, 39 interviews were carried out in November-
December 2013 and March-April 2014. Interviewees were
purposefully chosen as a sub-sample from the quantitative
survey sample reflecting the mix of health workers in
the districts, in terms of cadre, rural/urban post, gen-
der, type of facility and district of posting. A semi-
structured interview guide was prepared and flexibly
used to inform the interviews, while allowing space for
new themes and views to emerge. The interviews did
not focus exclusively on the health worker views of
PBF and the changes it brought, but were more broadly
centered on all the different incomes and sources
which make up the total remuneration of health
workers. Although the topic guide was iteratively
adapted during the interviews, the main themes of
focus remained (i) the health workers’ income sources
(including PBF), and views on level and fairness, and
(ii) non-financial features of the incomes which affect
the way health workers perceive and use their remu-
nerations. Interviews were then recorded, transcribed
and manually analyzed using content framework ana-
lysis [24]. Coding was carried out using a series of pre-
defined themes (such as, income features (e.g., how it
is paid, timeliness, regularity, etc.), health worker in-
come maximization strategies and income uses), as well
as by identifying emerging themes in the health
workers in their narratives. Critically, ‘motivation’ was
one of such emerging themes, in particular with refer-
ence to PBF payments. While all incomes are analyzed
together in another publication [25], because of the
relevance of issues concerning PBF and motivation in
the current international debate, a separate analysis is
carried out in this paper, specifically referring to the
health worker views on PBF.
Results
What PBF contributes to overall health worker income
The descriptive analysis of the health workers’ overall
revenues reveals that PBF accounts for 9–11 % of the
total monthly income across the different cadres (Fig. 1).
In comparison, salaries are the main source of revenue
for health workers, representing between 55 and 63 % of
the income, while per diem payments are the second
most important and account for up to 20 % of the in-
come. In absolute terms, looking for example at CHAs
and nurses, this means that salary accounts for about
130 USD monthly, while PBF bonuses contributes 20
USD per month and per diems about 50 USD (total
monthly income is 235 USD). Other revenues, such as
those from non-health activities (usually farming or
small trading businesses) and gifts from patients (usually
in-kind support from the community) are quite import-
ant and together add up to about the same amount as
PBF payments.
Determinants of PBF income
The multivariate models presented in Table 2 explore
which health workers are more likely to receive PBF bo-
nuses and higher bonuses. Results show that individual
factors do not influence these issues, with the exception
of being in-charge of the facility. Health workers in
charge are more likely to receive a PBF bonus and to re-
ceive a higher PBF amount than others. The second
finding suggests that the scheme is implemented as
Fig. 1 Absolute and relative average income by cadre and by component, including PBF payments (n = 266)
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designed, since being in-charge grants more ‘points’ in
the calculation of their bonus.
Looking at facility-level characteristics, it emerges
that health workers posted in Community Health Posts
are more likely to receive a PBF bonus, thus pointing to
unexpected differences between facilities in the imple-
mentation of the scheme. Finally, in the logistic model
there are important variations at district level, as health
workers are more likely to receive PBF bonuses in
Kenema. These patterns across district confirm what
was found at meso-level about the implementation of
PBF and the effects of the presence of NGOs supporting
the scheme [22]. In particular, in Kenema, it is possible
that the presence of one NGO providing support to all
primary facilities, as well as to the DHMT, improved the
implementation of the verification procedures and of the
payments, and therefore health workers are found to be
more likely to receive PBF bonuses.
Health worker views of PBF and motivation
While the quantitative data allow us a preliminary un-
derstanding of the relative importance and the potential
motivational impact of PBF, the qualitative interviews
complete and enrich this picture. Overall, health workers
had positive views on the idea of being paid based on
their performance, and reported that effort exerted in-
creased following the introduction of performance-based
payments. Health workers said:
“It [PBF] helps us improve more in our work. […] You
will put more effort” (CHA/nurse in Kenema)
“We work harder [with PBF]” (CHA/nurse in Kenema)
“It’s a good system because then you perform. If you
do not perform well, you do not receive the money”
(MCH Aide in Kenema)
“PBF motivates us. Where do I feel there is a lack?
Why are my friends getting more than me? What was
my problem? Then you sit down and check yourself”
(MCH Aide in Kenema).
It is interesting to note that all those quotes were
from health workers posted in Kenema, where mea-
sures to complement the PBF scheme were supported
by an external NGO covering all facilities. Moreover,
the last quote points to the fact that PBF entail a self-
reflective process in which in-charges compare them-
selves to their colleagues in other facilities to improve
service delivery.
Table 2 Determinants of receiving a PBF bonus and of the amount received
(1) (2)
Did receive PBF bonus (1 = yes) Amount of PBF bonus
Health Worker characteristics
Male 0.456 (0.457) 0.253 (0.169)
Age −0.341 (0.307) -
In-charge 1.342 (0.386)*** 0.343 (0.154)**
Cadre (omitted category : MCH Aide)
Community Health Officers −0.884 (0.701) 0.105 (0.277)
Community Health Assistants + nurses −1.057 (0.442)** 0.052 (0.181)
Facility characteristics
Type of facility (omitted category: Maternal and Child Health Post)
Community Health Centre 0.735 (0.506) 0.026 (0.209)
Community Health Post 0.920 (0.415)** −0.122 (0.158)
Urban 0.189 (0.358) 0.101 (0.138)
District (omitted category: Moyamba)
Bo −0.199 (0.328)
Kenema 0.677 (0.351)*
Constant −0.609 (0.457) 11.293 (0.219)***
Obs 266 163
Log-likelihood −163.335 -
Proportion of correct answers predicted 65.8 %
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
Model (1) is a normal logistic regression as the multi-level model with regional fixed effects was not statistically superior, Model (2) is a multi-level linear regression
with district fixed effects, which is statistically superior to a standard mode
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When asked about their views on PBF as an income,
health workers seemed to be satisfied and positive, espe-
cially if compared to the generally negative comments
on their salary, even if the latter is their main source of in-
come. Health workers said that PBF “helps” (two MCH
Aides and a CHA/nurse in Bo, Kenema and Moyamba), is
“good money” (two CHA/nurses in Bo and Kenema), or
“really enough” (MCH Aide in Kenema). The positive
perception of PBF compared to salary seems to be linked
to the fact that PBF bonuses, given the unpredictability of
the payment, are seen as complement or windfall, with
less sense of entitlement compared to the salary. A health
worker said,
“It [PBF] is manageable, it is just an addition” (CHA/
nurse in Kenema) [where ‘manageable’ indicates that
its level is financially satisfying]
Despite these positive views, when directly probed
on whether they would prefer a salary increase or an
increase in PBF fees allocated for each service pro-
vided, health workers agreed that they would prefer a
salary increase:
“I would prefer an increase in salary, because PBF
depends on us, on the way we work” (MCH Aide
in Kenema)
“We have PBF but not all the times. Instead of
waiting for PBF, let our salary increase” (MCH
Aide in Kenema)
Non-financial aspects of PBF found to motivate health
workers
During the interviews, health workers spontaneously
mentioned that non-financial aspects of the PBF scheme
contributed to their increased motivation and perform-
ance. In the quotes below, they reported that they under-
stood better their tasks and responsibilities, because of
how the service delivery requirements are detailed in the
PBF contracts and in the quality checklist.
“PBF is good, but not only the money. You receive the
money and you eat it, but when you are used to [fill
in] the partograph, then you enjoy your job” (MCH
Aide in Moyamba)
“I prefer PBF because it helps me. Now I know what
to do and what not to do” (MCH Aide in Kenema)
Health workers also found motivation through the im-
provements in the working environment that are paid
for with the facility component of the bonus. One health
worker said,
“The part used for the facility is motivating. We are
improving, we are managing the center” (CHO in Bo).
Other features of PBF payments that (de)motivate
health workers
Moreover, PBF bonuses also have features of which
health workers can take advantage within their income
utilization strategies. As the quarterly PBF bonus can be
a relatively substantial amount of money earned at once,
compared to other incomes which are paid in a more
fragmented way, it can be saved from family pressures
and routine expenditures, and reinvested in non-health
income generating activities. An analysis of the quantita-
tive survey data confirmed that income from non-health
activities were significantly higher for those with higher
PBF bonuses (p = 0.05). In turn, revenues from non-
health activities provide a certain income stability which
allows dealing with the instability of most incomes (e.g.
PBF and per diems). One health worker explained,
“I do some little trading, I plan to buy palm oil
[with unspent PBF money] and store until the price
is favorable. I don’t really schedule because PBF
doesn’t come every day, but whenever money is
coming you get uses” (CHA/nurse in Bo).
On the other hand, a complaint concerned how PBF is
shared -or not- by in-charges with the other workers. In
other cases, though, sharing practices, highlighting the
existence of team spirit within facilities, were found, in
particular in health centers with fewer staff. In some
cases, health workers posted immediately after training
were given individual bonuses despite not being eligible
for it as not working in facility when the bonus was ac-
crued. This practice was justified by the fact that they
were not yet on payroll and would have little alternative
financial means to support themselves.
“Last time I went for a meeting, there was a lady who
went with a complain, saying that her colleague did
not recognize her with the PBF” (MCH Aide in Bo).
“She [the in-charge] is encouraging me by giving it
[share of PBF] to me” (MCH Aide in Bo).
“She [the other nurse] was not here, but even if when
I receive PBF I give her something” (MCH Aide in
Moyamba).
PBF implementation issues and HW motivation
One of the problems indicated by health workers are the
long delays in the payment of PBF. Those delays are a
key issue that affects the scheme, because they effectively
remove the link between effort at facility level and
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payment provided. Moreover, the delays in payment en-
tail complicated bonus sharing practices. Indeed, often
those who worked in the facility when the bonus was ac-
crued are posted elsewhere by the time of its receipt
after 1 year. As a consequence, ‘old’ and ‘new’ staff in the
facility have to travel and meet in person, in order to
make sure the payment is shared with the worker enti-
tled to receive it. This system is extremely complicated
given the absence of bank transfers and the difficulties
in communication and travel in Sierra Leone, and it re-
lies on the transparency of the in-charges in informing
and tracing the staff to provide them the correct pay-
ment. Instances of misappropriation or mismanagement
of PBF bonuses by some in-charges, as well as imple-
mentation failures and mistakes have been recounted
during the in-depth interviews:
“I have no access [to PBF] now, because the nurse
that was in this center before took the registry and
went with it” (MCH Aide in Moyamba).
“12 health centers where left out [never received PBF
payments – out of 99 in Moyamba district]. Maybe
the computer jumped our name…? We don’t know”
(MCH Aide in Moyamba).
Another issue around PBF which limit its potential for
motivating health workers are the difficulties they ex-
perience in accessing the payment. The bonus is re-
ceived via the facility bank account which is usually
located in the district town, far from the rural facilities,
and there is often no information on when it will be
paid. In the quote below, a health worker in Kenema re-
counts the problems in accessing PBF:
“PBF does help actually, but the time to get out PBF is
our problem. Because the time when it [the PBF
bonus] comes, we have to go through a lot of process
before ever accessing it. Certain times you pay
transport to Kenema and be there for 1 or 2 days and
you are not able to access the money, or they tell you
to come another time” (CHA/nurse in Kenema).
Discussion
The findings presented in this paper show the potential
for motivation of performance-based pay in Sierra Leone
and of the possible paths through which PBF can motiv-
ate health workers, as seen from their own perspective.
The analysis allows us a first understanding of the rela-
tive importance of PBF, in comparison with the other,
formal and informal, income sources. It emerges that, in
the context of primary healthcare facilities in Sierra
Leone, PBF payments are of a relatively small amount
(about 10 %) compared to the overall income. However,
as found in other settings [26], other factors beyond the
monetary face value influence the perceptions of health
workers. PBF as a scheme seems to be well perceived
and relatively motivating for health workers because of
some non-financial features in its design. One of these is
the clarification of responsibilities and tasks in service
delivery, which resonates with similar findings in the
context of Burundi [27]. Another is the perceived im-
provement in the physical working environment thanks
to the facility component of the bonus, which is also
noted in Nigeria [26] and Malawi [28]. Our findings
highlight a tension in the narratives of the health
workers between seeing PBF bonuses as a reward for ef-
fort and viewing them as a windfall, as both notions are
there for the staff. Often, the unexpected addition to the
income provided by PBF payments is seen as a windfall,
which takes a different place in the “mental accounts” of
health workers and can be spent differently [25]. Health
workers also take advantage of the fact that the amount
of the payment can be substantial within their income
utilization strategies, where PBF is useful to complement
and balance the features of other incomes. The strategies
for differential use of different incomes by health
workers in Sierra Leone are further explored in another
publication [25].
On the other hand, a series of design and implementa-
tion issues act as ‘demotivators’ and limit the motiv-
ational effects of the incentive. Delays in the payment of
the PBF bonus, due to lengthy verification procedures
or other issues, are reported across different schemes
[26, 29–31] and acknowledged to be a major chal-
lenge, in particular because of the disconnection that
they cause between effort/performance and payment
which is in fact a key point in the theory of change
of PBF incentives. Another tension in PBF schemes
comes from the fact that performance is measured at
facility rather than individual level, and that individual
rewards are calculated afterwards, either based on
cadre and hierarchy as in the case of Sierra Leone, or
on a measure of individual effort, as done in other
contexts [26, 30]. A previous study in Sierra Leone
[32] found that health staff were motivated by PBF
but frustrated by the erratic and unpredictable nature
of the payments and because the bonus is shared
based on cadre, systematically privileging those in-
charge. As found in another setting [30], our findings
show mixed results regarding the potential of per-
formance bonuses paid to the facility for the motiv-
ation or demotivation of the staff as a team. Some
health workers reported sharing payments with those
newly arrived who are not entitled to them, pointing
to collaboration and reciprocity between staff, while
others stressed their discontent for not receiving their
rightful bonus. MoHS staff at central level mentioned
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that “PBF is seen as motivating, but not fair”2. While
it has been explored in high-income settings [33] and
in experimental economic studies outside of the
health sector [34, 35], the impact on motivation and
performance of the sharing practices within the facil-
ity team is an issue which deserves further research
across PBF schemes and in low-income settings [14].
Finally, compared to other countries [26, 36], health
workers in Sierra Leone did not raise the issue of be-
ing demotivated by increased workload linked to PBF,
likely because PBF was introduced relatively shortly
after the introduction of the free health care initiative
which had already entailed a substantial increase in
patient load [19] and possibly also because PBF as
implemented in Sierra Leone did not create additional
reporting requirements.
Our study has some limitations. Despite the use of dif-
ferent techniques (i.e., survey, longitudinal logbook and
in-depth interviews) to triangulate information and avoid
biases, one issue concern the reliability of data on income
amounts, especially for the most sensitive ones (user fees,
gifts and payments from patients, sale of drugs, etc.).
However, we consider that for official incomes, such as
PBF, the estimate is likely to be reliable. In terms of data
analysis, variables at facility level concerning the availabil-
ity of filled-in registries, drugs, equipment, infrastructure,
and other factors which could influence the amount re-
ceived as PBF bonus were not included. However, we pro-
vide qualitative information in terms of the varying
support that facilities receive from NGOs in the districts
which could partially explain some of the differences. Fi-
nally, the results discussed above are closely related to the
specific context, as well as the design features and imple-
mentation challenges of the PBF scheme in Sierra Leone
and may not be valid for other contexts and PBF schemes.
This stresses the importance of understanding the setting
and the specific challenges in the study of PBF schemes.
Beyond the context-specific findings, what our study
points to in a generalizable manner is the importance of
research focusing not only on the outputs and outcomes
of a PBF scheme, but also on the design and the imple-
mentation details [30, 31], in order to unpack and under-
stand the underlying mechanisms by which PBF can
motivate or demotivate health workers in practice, and
from their own perspective. Our analysis also stresses that
the remuneration of health workers is complex and inter-
related, so that not only the monetary value of the finan-
cial incentive is relevant for their motivation, but also
other features of the payments, which affect the way they
are utilized and perceived by the health workers.
Conclusions
This study provides a description of the absolute and
relative importance of PBF payments within the income
of public primary healthcare workers in Sierra Leone
and of their views on the motivation provided by
performance payments in the context of the overall
revenues and incomes.
For policy makers in Sierra Leone, these findings are
particularly relevant for the current post-Ebola Virus
Disease (EVD) health system strengthening efforts. Dur-
ing the EVD outbreak, the PBF scheme continued to
function, although under an even simpler model (e.g.
payments were based on data of the health information
system with no verification performed) [37], which is
likely to have heightened the problems observed above
and created others. At the same time, a new scheme was
briefly piloted by an NGO in 2015 in the district of
Bombali under a different design (so-called “PBF Plus”).
While this pilot addressed some of the issues of the
‘simple’ PBF scheme, other challenges emerged, in par-
ticular concerning costs and sustainability. At the mo-
ment, the future of PBF in Sierra Leone is uncertain
and potential new models are being discussed. Given
the critical role that PBF seem to play for health
workers and facilities despite the numerous weaknesses,
it is important that the future development of the PBF
scheme capitalize on the lessons learned and builds on
them to guarantee an effective role of PBF towards
health system strengthening.
Overall, the results confirm the importance of looking
beyond each single financial incentive available to health
workers separately, but to include all incomes and ex-
plore the interrelated dynamics between them which
contribute to motivation and performance at individual
and team level. As health workers put in place compen-
sating and coping strategies for income use, it is import-
ant that researchers and policy-makers look at the
effects on motivation of each revenue stream (including
performance payments) in relation to one another and
considering the broader incentive environment. Findings
also stress that the implementation of a PBF scheme at
national, district and facility level has a critical impact
on the ways it motivates or demotivates health workers
and, therefore, must be thoroughly researched in order
to assess the impact of PBF.
Endnotes
1Maternal and Child Health Posts are the lowest level
of primary healthcare centers in the health system, and
provide only services related to immunization and child
health, delivery and maternal health, family planning and
nutrition. They are staffed by one or two nursing aides
(Maternal and Child Health Aides). At a higher level are
Community Health Posts and Community Health Centres
provide a broader range of curative services and are staffed
with non-physician clinicians (Community Health Offi-
cers/CHOs and Community Health Assistants/CHAs),
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nurses and midwives. Community Health Centres are the
largest health centers of all and usually headed by CHOs,
who are also responsible for supervising the Maternal and
Child Health Posts in their area.
2Personal communication with MoHS
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